Irresponsibilities, inequalities and injustice for autonomous vehicles by Liu, Hin-Yan
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Irresponsibilities, inequalities and injustice for autonomous vehicles
Liu, Hin-Yan
Published in:
Ethics and Information Technology
Publication date:
2017
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Liu, H-Y. (2017). Irresponsibilities, inequalities and injustice for autonomous vehicles. Ethics and Information
Technology, 19(3), 193-207.
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Ethics Inf Technol (2017) 19:193–207 
DOI 10.1007/s10676-017-9436-2
ORIGINAL PAPER
Irresponsibilities, inequalities and injustice for autonomous 
vehicles
Hin‑Yan Liu1  
Published online: 22 August 2017 
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017
Keywords Autonomous vehicles · Structural 
discrimination · Responsibility · Network-effects · 
Inequality · Trolley-problem ethics · Risk allocation · 
Impunity
Introduction
Autonomous vehicles appear poised to enter society in the 
near future, considering the rapid and accelerating advance-
ment of the technologies this millennium. While the tech-
nology has forged ahead relentlessly, our legal and ethical 
frameworks remain mired in doubt and seemingly paralysed 
in face of the challenges wrought forth by the prospect of 
vehicles functioning without a direct human operator. Cen-
tral to this conundrum is the question of responsibility for 
the negative outcomes of autonomous vehicle operation, 
which is now verging upon statistical inevitability (Robbins 
2016): the beleaguered ‘who is responsible’ question. Yet, 
the persistence of the responsibility issue suggests that the 
question has not been adequately refined, leading to pro-
posals resting on assumptions and answers being couched 
in generalities. This article aims to infuse nuance into the 
overarching responsibility question: by questioning the 
necessity for ascribing responsibility at all; by differentiating 
between the disparate concepts that together inform exist-
ing notions of responsibility; and by approaching the issue 
from the polar perspectives of targeting and risk distribution. 
In defining these constituent issues, this article narrows the 
responsibility issues and identifies more precisely the nature 
of the persistent problems which plague attempts to define 
models of responsibility for autonomous vehicles.
The article then discusses moves that circumvent or 
marginalise the responsibility question which are made 
possible by the prospect for autonomous vehicles to have 
Abstract With their prospect for causing both novel 
and known forms of damage, harm and injury, the issue 
of responsibility has been a recurring theme in the debate 
concerning autonomous vehicles. Yet, the discussion of 
responsibility has obscured the finer details both between 
the underlying concepts of responsibility, and their appli-
cation to the interaction between human beings and arti-
ficial decision-making entities. By developing meaningful 
distinctions and examining their ramifications, this article 
contributes to this debate by refining the underlying concepts 
that together inform the idea of responsibility. Two differ-
ent approaches are offered to the question of responsibility 
and autonomous vehicles: targeting and risk distribution. 
The article then introduces a thought experiment which situ-
ates autonomous vehicles within the context of crash opti-
misation impulses and coordinated or networked decision-
making. It argues that guiding ethical frameworks overlook 
compound or aggregated effects which may arise, and which 
can lead to subtle forms of structural discrimination. Insofar 
as such effects remain unrecognised by the legal systems 
relied upon to remedy them, the potential for societal ine-
qualities is increased and entrenched, situations of injustice 
and impunity may be unwittingly maintained. This second 
set of concerns may represent a hitherto overlooked type 
of responsibility gap arising from inadequate accountability 
processes capable of challenging systemic risk displacement.
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pre-set preferences for accident scenarios. These preferences 
essentially allocate risks in advance of accidents in order to 
optimise crashes by seeking to minimise objective levels of 
damage. While lauded as an important improvement that 
promises to save lives and protect property, the possibil-
ity that risk allocation preferences for autonomous vehicles 
forecloses important aspects of the responsibility discussion. 
Furthermore, such risk allocation preferences can be coor-
dinated and consolidated by designers and manufacturers 
across a fleet of autonomous vehicles, exerting systemic 
pressures that consistently structure the allocation of the 
risks posed by those autonomous vehicles. Such cumulative 
effects mask the potential for subtle, yet powerful, struc-
tural inequalities to be entrenched within the algorithms that 
govern their behaviour, but which remain unrecognised by 
contemporary legal concepts and doctrines.
This subtle scenario is explored through a thought-exper-
iment which takes the logic of crash optimisation to specu-
latively radical extremes. The quest to minimise objective 
levels of damage might involve, indeed mandate, qualitative 
factors to be entered into the calculus. Optimisation might 
no longer be restricted to minimising damage, but transform 
into preventing the greatest forms of harm in more proactive 
ways. These perspectives suggest the limits of contempo-
rary conceptions of responsibility in relation to the introduc-
tion of autonomous vehicles, suggesting that resolving the 
debates on responsibility and legal liability is necessary but 
insufficient in governing their introduction onto public roads.
Why responsibility?
Autonomous vehicles have been projected to fundamentally 
alter the nature of driving as an activity by substituting and 
rendering obsolete the human driver. Architectures for liabil-
ity and compensation need to be constructed where such 
activities result in the production of harm to avert allegations 
of impunity.
The etymology of responsibility anchors the notion in the 
idea of responding or answering to, or being accountable 
for, a given action which is usually a wrong. The need for 
responsibility is rooted in relation to a perceived transgres-
sion. With autonomous vehicles, subject to the caveats that 
the programming was undertaken without malice and that 
their software has not been otherwise compromised, it may 
be difficult to categorise the harms they generate as moral 
wrongs or legal injuries.
Taking moral wrongs first, despite the obvious and nec-
essary application of ethics to the operation of autonomous 
vehicles (Lin 2015) it is neither immediately obvious nor 
necessarily the case that ethical codes would be violated by 
specifying one ethical framework or set of morally-relevant 
priorities over another. This conclusion can be deduced from 
the ethical debates delving beneath this surface to discuss 
the finer points of applying ethical theories (Goodall 2014; 
Gerdes and Thornton 2015; Bonnefon et al. 2015) which 
identify problematics and preferences from particular moral 
perspectives. The point is that there is no sign of agreement 
as to what course of action is morally correct in any specific 
setting; rather a range of possibilities remain open that may 
be more or less morally defensible. Absent a clear prospect 
for unambiguous moral wrongs that are triggered by the 
prospect of autonomous vehicles, it may be that questions 
of responsibility in this realm can be deferred or suspended.
Moving to the legal categorisation, the threshold concern 
is how a particular harm is seen through the jurisprudential 
lens (Liu 2015). Neil MacCormick articulates this legal bias 
succinctly:
The special sort of [jurisprudential] reasoning is one 
which leaves aside any general and abstract delibera-
tion on what in a given context it would be best or 
would all things considered right to do or not to do. 
Where law is appealed to, all things are not consid-
ered. (MacCormick 1995. Emphasis added.)
Scott Veitch builds upon this selective admission of 
acceptable considerations to illustrate the blinkered and 
tautological nature of legal processes:
What registers in law as a wrong? This question has a 
deceptively simple answer: what registers in law as a 
wrong is a breach of the law. Strictly speaking, then, 
it is not any particular loss—physical suffering, eco-
nomic harm, or whatever—that registers as such, but 
rather only that suffering or harm that is given legal 
cognisance. (Veitch 2007. Emphasis added.)
Woven together, these arguments ground the legal myopia 
that may be capable of overlooking injuries. At this point, 
the distinctions drawn in this article in relation to the ter-
minology need to be properly introduced: harm, damage, 
wrong and injury. Both harm and damage connote nega-
tive outcomes that can be devoid of ethical or legal conse-
quences, and relate to the concept of casual responsibility 
elaborated below. The notion of wrong implies an infrac-
tion with potential moral, and possibly legal, consequences. 
As such, wrongs begin to assert the need for responsibility, 
yet at the same time conflate role and causal concepts of 
responsibility discussed below. Finally, injury as understood 
in its root sense of injuria, meaning an invasion of another’s 
rights or conversely a legally actionable wrong, demonstrate 
the distance between the harm and its (legal) recognition. 
This gap obscures the prospect of damage occurring without 
injury being recognised (Veitch 2007), leading to the possi-
bility that the liability conception of responsibility rendering 
obsolete the broader question of responsibility.
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To unpack the last argument, two responsibility-related 
questions can be articulated in the present context: should 
the harms engendered by autonomous vehicles be cat-
egorised as damage, wrongs or injuries; and what are the 
broader implications of this taxonomy? The irrelevance 
of responsibility to the operation of autonomous vehicles 
can be asserted where any harm or damage these cause fail 
to be recognised as moral wrongs or legal injuries. While 
the autonomous vehicle might be responsible for bringing 
about a particular harm in a causal sense (Hart 2008), it is 
plausible that no infraction will be registered such that the 
harm is treated analogously to natural phenomena.1 In such 
instances, restitution may become the driving principle to 
restore as closely as possible the situation the victim was in 
had the harm not occurred.2 The broader implications of this 
legally-dominated classification scheme, therefore, include 
the possibility that wrongs and injuries may be foreclosed 
through moral and legal interpretations.
Flowing from these conclusions are consequences for the 
forms of compensation that victims of autonomous vehicle 
harms may take. Where such harm remains in the realm of 
damage, a restitutionary mechanism of compensation should 
suffice to undo as far as possible the detriment suffered by 
the victim, and can take the form of an insurance or other 
collectivised risk-mitigation scheme (including models of 
strict liability such as that proposed by Hevelke and Nida-
Rümelin 2015). From this perspective, legalistic questions 
of responsibility-ascription are both unnecessary and con-
voluted: the victim can have ready access to adequate and 
appropriate compensation without the need to resort to the 
legal mechanisms, and the courts will not be required to 
overstretch existing modalities of responsibility to ensure 
that victims are not left without redress. Thus, the advan-
tages to leaving responsibility out of the discussion are that 
practical avenues can be smoothed without undermining 
legal doctrine.
Despite good reasons to circumvent the thorny issues 
of responsibility entirely, however, the ascription of harms 
caused by autonomous vehicles may not appropriately 
remain within the sphere of harms and damage, for a pleth-
ora of reasons revolving around the possibility for the auton-
omous vehicle to exercise discretion. In other words, moral 
and legal questions arise as the direct result of the ability of 
the car to function autonomously: to commit itself to one 
course of action among many, and to do so based upon a set 
of parameters. Thus, discretion is the lynchpin of autonomy 
and introduces concepts of responsibility (Liu 2016) through 
the programming which establish the parameters and the 
actual behaviour of the autonomous vehicle.
Furthermore, unlike the refined responsibility ques-
tions raised in the context of autonomous weapons sys-
tems and the use of lethal force, a distinction need not be 
drawn between functional and discretional autonomy (Liu 
2016).3 Unlike the autonomous weapons system where the 
source of the hazard is in the explicit targeting function, 
with the autonomous vehicle the hazard inheres within its 
ordinary operation. Functional and discretional autonomy 
are collapsed because the autonomous vehicle allocates the 
potential harms it generates as a by-product of getting from 
one point to another, unlike an autonomous weapons system 
which actively selects which target to engage.
Taken together, these perspectives provide the basis for 
policies which can distribute the harms created by autono-
mous vehicles through a compensatory model that circum-
vents the responsibility conundrum beyond establishing cau-
sation.4 Alternatively, policies may have to mandate detailed 
examinations of the precise contours of responsibility and 
liability, to which we now turn.
The rope metaphor of responsibility
To introduce and illustrate the notion of responsibility that 
is being unravelled in this article, it is useful to draw upon 
an analogy with the rope in order to highlight several key 
features. At the functional level, the rope is connective and 
relational: for it to be useful its two ends must be connected 
and in doing so it joins two particular objects together. Put 
differently, the true utility of the rope would not be prop-
erly appreciated if it was not deployed to attach two discrete 
points together. Furthermore, aside from abstractions, the 
two points or objects that are linked together by the rope are 
clearly identifiable and cannot be readily interchanged with-
out affecting the relationship between both the end points or 
between the object and the rope.
Inspecting the rope for its intrinsic characteristics it 
becomes readily apparent that despite appearing, and being 
labelled, as a singular entity a rope in reality braids together 
several independent strands in order to deploy and reinforce 
them towards the same ends. Considered in this light, the 
apparent unity of the rope is subtly misleading for three 
1 HLA Hart, in proposing the typology of responsibility, suggested 
that ‘it is clear that in this causal sense not only human beings but 
also their actions or omissions, and things, conditions, and events, 
may be said to be responsible for outcomes’, p. 214.
2 Whereas wrongs and injuries import blame, the neutral status of 
harm and damage may be remedied by reinstating the position prior 
to the event triggering the harm or damage.
3 Functional autonomy describes systems which are capable of 
undertaking only predetermined or strictly limited forms of independ-
ent action, while systems possessing discretional autonomy substitute 
human decision-making processes in its domain, p. 327.
4 Existing models for this include modalities of strict liability, as well 
as mandatory insurance scehemes.
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reasons. The first contextualises this unity in relation to the 
functioning of the rope. Thus, while the notion of the rope 
exists in the abstract, what is really doing the binding work 
in the real world are the interwoven strands that are pull-
ing in the same direction. This view also reveals that the 
strength of the rope is contingent upon that composition of, 
and interaction between, the component strands and also 
that each strand is capable of fulfilling analogous functions 
independently. Second, the labelling convenience reveals 
the rope as a heuristic labelling device, it is a short cut for 
describing a generic object used to bind things together. 
This highlights the thoughtlessness, usually unproblematic, 
of calling the rope ‘the rope’ even though such treatment 
obscures in reality many nuanced details. The third and per-
haps most important, albeit seemingly trite, observation the 
rope is very often used, but rarely contemplated with such 
detail. Like with labelling, this treatment is largely justi-
fied because the utility of the rope is in its function, which 
remains the case only until the point where its composition 
becomes relevant to its usefulness.
A final set of observations that can be made about the 
rope is that it has a tensile strength, and it may break if 
stretched beyond its limits. But the precise breaking point is 
governed by two main factors, the composition of the rope 
and what objects it tied together. The nature of the braided 
strands largely determines the ultimate strength of the rope, 
but its real world performance also depends upon what it is 
deployed to join together.
The purpose of this digression is to draw out precise 
analogies with the notion of responsibility which reflect 
the detailed description of the rope above point for point. 
Thus, the first observation is that responsibility is neces-
sarily relational: this observation can also be discerned 
from the shared etymological root of the ‘responsibility’ 
with ‘response’. In this sense, the notion of responsibility 
is a connector that links together an actor with an action or 
consequence, such that the notion cannot stand by itself. 
As a result, the notion of responsibility is determined to a 
large extent by its relational context. The context in which 
responsibility is applied sets the tone for both the content 
and limitations of the notion.
Turning next to the intrinsic characteristics, the notion 
of responsibility interlaces several distinct and independ-
ent, albeit interrelated, concepts that work together towards 
shared goals. In this respect, however, it should be clear that 
the responsibility ‘rope’ need not be comprised of the same 
strands across situations, but rather that different strands may 
be plaited together as the specific situation dictates (these 
conceptual strands are introduced properly in the follow-
ing section). In this light, the notion of responsibility can 
be seen as an overarching framework that is populated by 
appropriate and relevant concepts dictated by the situation. 
Following from this, and mirroring the first reason that a 
blanket approach to responsibility is misleading, the precise 
meaning of ‘responsibility’ becomes contingent upon actual 
responsibility concepts that are in fact deployed. As we will 
see below, different meanings, limitations and consequences 
attach to the different concepts of responsibility which 
feedback to determine both the content and the contours 
of ‘responsibility’ in any given situation. Thus, recourse to 
these constituent concepts can calibrate our expectations 
with respect to responsibility issues and reveal the bounda-
ries of possibility inherent in deploying those concepts.
The second reason that ‘responsibility’ can be misleading 
then is that this is bandied about as a generic and blanket 
notion, readily discernible in claims that there will always 
be ultimate responsibility for autonomous vehicles (March-
ant and Lindor 2012).5 But it matters a great deal what form 
of responsibility is applied: crudely, it is clear that manu-
facturer responsibility is governed by omission rather than 
commission (this is discussed in greater detail below). Put 
differently, claims that a human being will be ultimately 
responsible for autonomous vehicles may be simultaneously 
true while missing the point entirely: true in the sense that 
a human being may bear some form of omission responsi-
bility in relation to the autonomous vehicle, while remain-
ing tangential to societal concerns which gravitate towards 
establishing responsibility for active commission of a par-
ticular harm.
Building from this, the under-examined nature of ‘respon-
sibility’ is the third reason that appeals to the notion can be 
misleading. Absent a differentiated and calibrated model of 
responsibility assertions feel empty and unsatisfying, doing 
little to assuage the broad concerns flowing from emerging 
technologies and the ensuing questions of ‘responsibility’. 
Yet, because ‘responsibility’ remains relatively unexplored, 
discussions can but skim the surface and neither the crux of 
the problem nor possible avenues leading towards solutions 
can be identified.
Finally, the cursory treatment of ‘responsibility’ thus 
risks over-extending the notion, creating increasingly tenu-
ous connections and artificial assertions with relation to 
autonomous vehicles and human beings. The metaphor of 
tensile strength that was alluded to above applies in the con-
ceptual context to indicate the limits to applying ‘responsi-
bility’ to connect novel things together. In this sense, over-
extension risks undermining the associated legal concepts 
and delegitimating the very idea that responsibilities, in 
whatever form, are an important considerations.
5 Marchant and Lindor in this case stipulate the caveat that the manu-
facturer is ultimately responsible from a doctrinal perspective, which 
suggests that the flaw in reasoning is with the legal doctrine upon 
which they comment.
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Role and capacity responsibility; causal 
responsibility
Having sketched the contours of responsibility as a broad 
notion, and having begun its dissection, we are now in a 
position to define the constituent concepts (or strands, 
in the rope metaphor) that combine under the notion of 
responsibility.
The core question of responsibility raised by autonomous 
vehicles is the replacement of the human driver with that of 
an artificial entity. While artificial entities, such as corpora-
tions, can possess legal personality and enjoy legal rights 
(in the United States, see Santa Clara County v Southern 
Pacific Railroad 1886, for the United Kingdom, see Salo-
mon v A Salomon 1897), ascribing corporate responsibil-
ity has remained a persistent problem (Coffee 1981; Bakan 
2005; Seck 2011) and may be a harbinger of the obstacles 
in the road ahead for autonomous vehicles. In the context 
of autonomous vehicles, however, the direct substitution of 
the human being as the causal agent is clear. To bridge the 
ensuing void of causal responsibility created by the autono-
mous vehicle (see generally, Matthias 2004), recourse has 
been made to omission-based forms of role responsibility, 
characterised in particular by the duty to intervene (Hevelke 
and Nida-Rümelin 2015).
In order to identify the contours and content of the vari-
ous concepts that together comprise the notion of respon-
sibility, it is useful to explicate the influential four-part 
typology developed by HLA Hart, which distinguished 
between role-responsibility, causal responsibility, liability-
responsibility, and capacity-responsibility (Hart 2008). Role 
responsibility is defined by the performance of prescribed 
duties and can be understood as sufficient efforts towards 
fulfilling a set of defined obligations attaching to one’s role 
or position. Causal responsibility connects causes with con-
sequences, but neither needs to include value judgments nor 
necessarily involve legal ramifications. Liability responsibil-
ity, as discussed above, involve the circuitous definition that 
centres upon legally-recognised injuries. Finally, capacity 
responsibility predicates responsibility ascription upon the 
possession and exercise of certain traits and abilities: ‘the 
ability to understand what conduct legal rules or morality 
require, to deliberate and reach decisions concerning these 
requirements, and to conform to decisions when made’ (Hart 
2008).
Having established this responsibility framework, we are 
now in a position to articulate accurately the responsibility 
issues introduced by the autonomous vehicle. It would be 
uncontroversial to assert that any harm caused by such a 
vehicle would mean that the vehicle would be responsible for 
the harm in a causal sense. Yet, because there are no moral 
or legal consequences that necessarily flow from such a 
determination, such a characterisation effectively amounts to 
labelling the harm as mere damage. Such a course of action 
may be unsatisfactory to the extent that it limits the victim 
to restitution, and where it fails to recognise any wrong or 
injury that is actually suffered as a result of the discretion-
ary potential possessed by the autonomous vehicle. Taken to 
the extreme, where the harm engendered by the autonomous 
vehicle affects the life or physical integrity of human beings, 
this treatment may amount to the negation of human dignity 
and a violation of human rights.6 The human being is treated 
in an instrumental fashion where the autonomous vehicle 
had committed itself to a course of action resulting in injury 
to human beings, which remains partially or incompletely 
recognised by the legal systems as an injury.
The human occupant7 of the autonomous vehicle is placed 
in a position where she bears responsibility for the actions 
of the vehicle over which she has limited or no effective 
control. This statement immediately collapses role respon-
sibility together with capacity responsibility, highlighting 
the intractable problems of borne by the human being in 
such a position. The duty to intervene is one such proposal 
(Hevelke and Nida-Rümelin 2015, an alternative characteri-
sation is that of the auto-pilot; Douma and Palodichuk 2012) 
and involves human oversight of the autonomous vehicle 
on the road. Thus, the obligation is placed upon the human 
occupant to remain vigilant for, and to anticipate reason-
ably foreseeable accidents, and to intervene accordingly. 
Yet, on a practical note as the authors concede, ‘it seems 
implausible that the otherwise idle user will be able to stay 
focused and searching for a possible risk of an accident 
which might occur on average once every 2 million kilo-
metres or so’ (Hevelke and Nida-Rümelin 2015). Research 
involving unmanned aerial vehicles in the military domain 
suggests that human boredom degrades both reaction times 
and the ability to maintain directed attention in oversight 
tasks (Cummings et al. 2013) which corroborate this claim. 
Taken together, this undermines the prospect for capacity 
responsibility for the occupant human beings for the harms 
caused by their autonomous vehicles.
Locating the duty to intervene within the realm of role 
responsibility and capacity responsibility underscore the 
limitations of this approach to bridging the responsibility 
gap. Taking the issue of role responsibility first, it is clear 
that this conception of responsibility is both grounded in and 
6 Christof Heyns articulates the human dignity argument: ‘Death by 
algorithm means that people are treated simply as targets and not as 
complete and unique human beings’ (Heyns 2016).
7 The human beings physically in the vehicle have been character-
ised in the literature primarily as the owners. Obviously, a proprietary 
relationship with the vehicle need not be the determining variable in 
the responsibility calculus. Instead, a more encompassing and con-
sistent criterion could be characterised on the basis a beneficiary sta-
tus in relation to that vehicle.
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curtailed by the scope of obligations borne by the individual. 
Thus, for role responsibility to function as a substitute for 
causal responsibility, both substantive content as well as the 
demarcated boundaries of the obligation must be specified 
clearly in advance. While this is not an absolute barrier to 
establishing role responsibility for autonomous vehicles, 
much work remains before a consensus can be reached.
The limitation inherent within the concept of role respon-
sibility, however, is that it can be distinguished by its formu-
lation as an omission. Because role responsibilities are func-
tions of specific obligations, these are articulated as failures 
to fulfil a pre-existing duty. This has two implications for the 
current discussion. First, there is an unbridgeable conceptual 
gulf between the separate notions of role-omission respon-
sibility and causal-commission responsibility (Liu 2016), 
such that negative outcomes can transpire despite the fulfil-
ment of role-responsibilities. These are in effect two separate 
strands of the responsibility rope which have been braided 
together so often that these are no longer treated as distinct 
and discrete concepts. Their independence can be illustrated 
by situations where an undesirable outcome arises in spite of 
relevant role responsibilities being satisfactorily discharged: 
a situation of simultaneous responsibility and irresponsi-
bility. The example with autonomous vehicles is where a 
vehicle was causally responsible for an accident despite the 
fact that the programmers, manufacturer and occupants had 
all fulfilled their due diligence obligations.
The second implication is that a role responsibility would 
be satisfied, or answered, by the fulfilment of the set of 
duties in question (depending on the precise formulation 
of the duty, an appropriate effort towards the satisfaction of 
the duty may be sufficient to offset role responsibility). In 
the context of autonomous vehicles, the occupant may have 
remained vigilant and fulfilled her (role-responsibility) duty 
to intervene in relation to an anticipated accident, but the 
collision may nevertheless ensue. In such an instance, the 
autonomous vehicle would have caused a negative conse-
quence, despite the occupant both bearing and satisfying her 
duty to intervene. In such an instance, meaningful responsi-
bility remains elusive.
Turning to capacity responsibility, there are signs that the 
occupants of autonomous vehicles may not be able to inter-
vene in anticipated accidents. From a practical perspective, 
simulation experiments report that human drivers may need 
up to forty seconds to regain situational awareness, which 
is significantly longer than the responsive time-frame for 
typical accident scenarios (Lin 2015). Others suggest that 
the requisite capacities may not be forthcoming for reasons 
including age, physical or psychological impairment or dis-
ability, inebriation, and tiredness. Those advocating a duty 
to intervene also overlook the prospect for self-handicap-
ping: to avoid responsibility ascription for accidents, those 
occupying autonomous vehicles may intentionally drink 
enough so that their blood alcohol concentration is over the 
legal limit, for example, or adopt clear strategies for distrac-
tion such as reading or sleeping that erode their capacity to 
intervene.8 Because capacity responsibility is hinged on the 
characteristics and behaviour of individuals, there are clear 
avenues for volitional circumvention.
Further complications arise in relation to capacity respon-
sibility where the autonomous vehicle replicates or exceeds 
human functioning on the road. In other words, where the 
human is the weakest link would it be ‘ethical for an autono-
mous vehicle to return control to the human driver if the 
vehicle predicts that a collision with the potential for dam-
age or injury in imminent?’ (Gerdes and Thornton 2015). 
Alternatively, would it be ethical for an autonomous vehicle 
to wrest control from the human driver to avoid an acci-
dent or minimise the damage or injury of a collision? (Lin 
2015). While these appear to be practical questions cali-
brated against the precise capabilities of both the human 
driver and the autonomous vehicle, the normative slant can 
be seen insofar as certain outcomes appear compelling.
Complicating the calculus even further is the prospect 
of an accident occurring where the human occupant takes 
over control from a properly functioning autonomous vehicle 
(Douma and Palodichuk 2012), resting on the presumption 
that the autonomous vehicle performs at least as well as a 
human driver. This fine balance suggests that the human 
occupant of an autonomous vehicle inhabits the proverbial 
space between a rock and a hard place. She may be com-
pelled to take action to avert an anticipated disaster, but she 
will be penalised if it turns out that her intervention is inap-
propriate to the situation: a dilemma that in practice needs 
to be processed within the compact time frame necessary to 
avoid an accident.
Programmer and manufacturer responsibilities
Together, the configurations of role responsibility and capac-
ity responsibility suggest that they will be poor candidates 
to substitute for the direct causal responsibility traditionally 
borne by the human driver in direct control of a vehicle.9 
8 Classically, responsibility doctrines trace intentional self-handicap-
ping back to the initial intentional action of self-handicapping, thus 
treating it as recklessness with regard to risks of foreseeable dam-
age. The clarity of this doctrine might be muddied by the omission 
nature of the occupant’s role responsibility that is akin to oversight—
the occupant only needs to be capable of intervening in an accident 
scenario and not of actively operating the vehicle. Moreover, where 
an accident occurs, the responsibility of the occupant will be limited 
to her failure to intervene, rather than for having caused the accident 
(thereby significantly curbing the scope of her liability).
9 While negligence is the typical form of responsibility on the road 
at present, such conflating conceptual distinctions presented here 
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Moreover, it is precisely the concept of causal responsibil-
ity, when coupled with mechanisms of censure and sanc-
tion, that reflects the societal concern when the notion of 
responsibility is relied upon in debates that discuss emerging 
technology regulation.
With autonomous vehicles, however, issues of role and 
capacity forms of responsibility can be revisited from the 
perspective of both the programmer and the manufacturer.10 
It is uncontroversial to note that the discretional autonomy 
of the vehicle by definition undermines claims that either 
the programmer or the manufacturer enjoy direct control, 
thereby subverting the possibility for either to bear causal 
responsibility in lieu of the human driver. Again, and along 
similar lines to the occupant, the question of causal respon-
sibility is instead displaced to obligation-omission forms of 
responsibility that are similarly curtailed by the content and 
character of the obligations. Distilled into different terms, 
the question of programmer or manufacturer responsibility 
concern issues of malicious intent or negligent oversight. 
While each bear clear role responsibilities, these are defined 
by duties which, if discharged, provide a satisfactory answer. 
Under this model, the programmer is expected to write code 
that leads to adequate performance, and the manufacturer is 
relied upon to create a product without significant defects. 
While the creation of both the code and the car set param-
eters that constrain the full range of autonomous vehicle 
behaviour to some extent, these amount at most to influ-
ences that fall short of determining the outcome. Under 
such circumstances, the role and capacity discussion above 
in relation to the occupant is mirrored for both the program-
mer and the manufacturer. Their role responsibility would 
be discharged provided that they had done their jobs well; 
at any rate, their capacities to influence the actual outcome 
may be curtailed by their remoteness to the final behaviour 
of the vehicle and the ensuing consequences.
It is curious to note, in this conjunction, the moral imper-
ative advanced by some commentators to lessen the impedi-
ments to developing autonomous vehicles that includes 
structuring the assertion of responsibility in a manner that 
does not impede their development and introduction (March-
ant and Lindor 2012; Hevelke and Nida-Rümelin 2015). This 
line of argumentation is grounded in the assumed social ben-
efit of autonomous vehicles being safer in the long run, and 
that regulation should be designed purposively. Yet, because 
of the non-identification problem—that different lives will 
be spared and sacrificed—those making this claim need 
ground the specifics to allow the debate over the distribu-
tion of risks and vulnerabilities to progress (Lin 2013a). If 
we are not cautious, the asserted moral imperative not to 
impede autonomous vehicle development runs the risk of 
diluting the already ambiguous responsibility and regula-
tory structures we rely upon to govern these technologies. 
Overlooked in such calls are both the significant commercial 
incentives aligned to those who market autonomous vehicles 
as well as the corporate resources which might go some 
distance to overcoming obstacles imposed by robust regu-
lation. Furthermore, it should be emphasised that corpora-
tions operate upon the legal imperative to generate profits 
for its shareholders, which predispose corporate activities 
to be measured along cost-benefit lines that has been docu-
mented to perversely maximise the bottom line, at least from 
society’s perspective (Bakan 2005).
Analogies with autonomous weapons systems?
The responsibility question raised by autonomous vehicles 
is in many ways a more benign but complex iteration of 
the responsibility debate on the introduction of autonomous 
weapons systems (Jain 2016; Liu 2016). In that context, the 
responsibility lacuna left by the substitution of a causally 
responsible human agent for an artificial decision-making 
weapons system has led to proposals of overlapping omis-
sion responsibilities to bridge the gap (Schulzke 2013). With 
autonomous vehicles as with autonomous weapons systems, 
however, asserting occupant responsibility in situations 
either where she has discharged her duties, and thus satis-
fied the requirements of role responsibility, or where she is 
incapable, for whatever reason, of intervening, remains an 
unsolved problem.
The zealous pursuit to hold somebody, anybody, respon-
sible amounts to more than moral defamation (as claimed 
by Hevelke and Nida-Rümelin 2015) but enters the peril-
ous realm of imposing over-responsibilities: it is interesting 
to note in this context that impunity does not have a ready 
antonym, the nearest being that of the scapegoat (Liu 2015, 
2016). Thus, proposing similar solutions revolving around 
overlapping role-responsibilities that highlight the obliga-
tions of designers, developers, manufacturers and maintain-
ers will not only fail to bridge the responsibility gap, but 
may also introduce perilous new challenges of asserting 
10 Both the programmer and the manufacturer are deployed here in 
their prototypical, singular, form. While the complexity involved in 
these processes suggest that these roles will be played by a multitude 
of persons and corporations, the point here is that significant respon-
sibility issues remain even in this rudimentary caricature of reality. 
Furthermore, the consideration here excludes other identifiable par-
ties who may bear at least a portion of the responsibility for an acci-
dent, such as the manufacturer of a component used in the autono-
mous system and the road designer where an intelligent road system 
is deployed to assist control of the autonomous vehicle (see Marchant 
and Lindor 2012).
become increasingly problematic when additional actors are involved 
in producing the outcome.
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accountability that is unhinged to control, foresight and due 
diligence.
Beyond responsibility and individualistic 
considerations?
Rather than obsessing over the responsibility void, if ready 
solutions are not forthcoming, it may be that we can cir-
cumvent it altogether by formulating policies that negate 
reliance upon the notion. In this sense, asking the question 
of responsibility railroads considerations towards individual-
istic notions dominated by concepts of individual autonomy, 
decision-making and discretion and directs attention towards 
accounting for one’s actions in a field of options and choices.
Instead, a countervailing perspective might be offered 
that foregrounds the idea of (pre-) determinacy and that 
stipulated policies might bypass the entrenched responsi-
bility debate. It could be argued that individualistic notions 
of responsibility are outmoded in an operational context 
where discretion in action can be replaced by formulae 
which dictate how the autonomous vehicle should behave 
in any given situation, and especially where such behaviour 
can be distributed broadly to a large number of units and can 
be updated regularly.
It is this very prospect for responsibility to become rel-
egated to the side-lines through prescribed policies which 
introduces the peril of entrenched inequalities. Underly-
ing the problematic question of responsibility remains the 
core of individuated discretion and autonomy that implies 
a variated and flexible approach to action. In a sense, the 
relational dimension of responsibility demands an account 
for justifications pertaining to a particular course of action in 
a given context. Yet, with widely replicated and prescribed 
policies, the variation of behaviours and outcomes have the 
potential to become severely constricted. Both the curtailed 
range of actions and the centralisation of discretion pose 
subtle structural amendments that threaten to erode equality 
and perpetuate injustice. The following sections examine the 
underexplored issues of centralisation and obfuscation asso-
ciated with the prospect for private companies to determine 
behavioural policies for autonomous vehicles.
Before proceeding, however, a brief outline of the ethi-
cal dilemma at the core of this debate is necessary. This is 
the much-discussed ‘trolley problem’ thought experiment 
in which variations of a restrained choice is presented: 
undertake an action which will result in quantitatively less 
harm, or passively allow events to unfold which will result in 
greater objective harm (for an overview, see Edmonds 2013). 
Recent applications of the trolley problem to the introduc-
tion of autonomous vehicles have sparked a debate about 
how to appropriately programme them for precisely such 
exigencies (see for example, Lin 2013b; Doctorow 2015; 
Davis 2015; Bonnefon et al. 2015. On the problems in equat-
ing trolley problems and autonomous vehicle algorithms, see 
also; Nyholm and Smids 2016).
The foundational oversight of applying trolley problem 
ethics to the introduction of autonomous vehicles is, how-
ever, that such an approach overlooks the networked and 
coordinated effects which are likely to become implemented 
through programming processes. In other words, there is 
a gross mismatch between the individuated ethical frame-
work expressed by the trolley problem and the emerging 
technological realities which have the potential at least to 
be in constant intercommunication and thereby act in coor-
dinated and preordained fashion. Viewing the introduction 
of autonomous vehicles through the lens of trolley prob-
lem ethics thus neglects the issues of aggregation: that is, 
whether certain actions or inactions remain justified when 
the consequences are compounded or cumulative. A course 
of action or inaction that can be justified, or even virtuous, at 
the individual level may lose such grounding if implemented 
as a policy that is biased towards generating certain types 
of outcomes. Importantly, this oversight converges with the 
responsibility discussion above to create a significant blind 
spot because causal responsibility dimensions are considered 
through singular case-by-case analysis and because the focus 
of role responsibility is upon individual obligation.
We will leave aside the issues of coordination, prescrip-
tion and aggregation that are overlooked by individuated 
trolley problem ethics for the moment in order to engage 
more directly in that debate, but will revisit these prob-
lems afterwards in the context of systematising inequalities 
through the operation of algorithms in autonomous vehicles.
Targeting
Invoking the trolley problem in the context of autonomous 
vehicles is often aligned with arguments for increasing 
road safety and decreasing accidents and fatalities. This has 
spurred discussion of crash optimisation (Lin 2015, see also, 
2014a, b) which in turn transformed into questions of target-
ing individuals where crashes are unavoidable.11 Empirical 
studies have begun to explore what essentially amount to 
targeting preferences (Bonnefon et al. 2015).
The question remains, however, whether results of rule-
based and sequentially cumulative decisions can amount to 
11 This targeting discussion is written under the assumption that 
this is an expression of ‘crash optimisation’: as actions and inactions 
within accident scenarios that minimise the objective total harm. 
These comments do not encompass the possibility for autonomous 
vehicles to be directed towards placing the risk burden on certain 
groups or individuals which would invoke a different set of issues 
beyond the scope of this paper.
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targeting individuals for harm per se, for three reasons. First, 
targeting implies intentional action against a pre-identifiable 
target, while trolley problem style accident scenarios involve 
coerced, time-restricted choices that curtail the scope of voli-
tion, and furthermore are not necessarily directed towards 
harming particular victims (although this can, troublingly, 
be the case as discussed below). Second, targeting is to a 
large extent decontextualised and preordained while trolley 
problem style accident scenarios set strong situational con-
texts which constrain decisions by placing parameters upon 
the range of possible actions. Third, autonomous vehicle 
programming does not determine particular future outcomes, 
but instead establish probabilistic courses of action in given 
contexts.
Taken together, there is significant conceptual distance 
between the intentional, unconstrained and directly causal 
act of targeting and the restrained time-pressured dilemma 
under which a decision in an accident scenario takes place. 
Adopting the targeting paradigm for autonomous vehicles 
also runs the risk of engraining the individualistic perspec-
tive because it isolates considerations to the impact of indi-
vidual actions upon isolated victims. Furthermore, discus-
sions of targeting foreground the considerations facing the 
agent in the relationship with the victims of the accident 
relationship. In doing so, adopting a targeting approach 
may become blind to cumulative impacts and systemic 
skews engendered by algorithmic policies aimed at acci-
dent optimisation.
Risk distribution: towards algorithmic risk 
allocation
The individuated and de-contextualised accident scenario, 
epitomised by the trolley-problem thought experiment, 
obscure three subtle yet pervasive factors that underlie the 
unease with which autonomous vehicle decision-making is 
discussed. First, stipulating preferences for action or inaction 
will be unavoidable, and a potential consequence will be that 
these pre-set values will remain consistent in practice over 
time. This tendency may then develop into structural biases 
where certain kinds of behaviour will be exhibited under 
certain conditions.12 While vague, this leads to the second 
concern, that decision-making for autonomous vehicles will 
no longer be individualistically atomised and responsive, but 
instead will become centralised, coordinated and proactive. 
It is precisely because of the possibility for these effects that 
issues revolving around responsibility can become marginal-
ised as accountability mechanisms are necessary only where 
possibilities exist for discretion and deviance. Compound-
ing the centralisation and coordination tendencies in setting 
preferences for the behaviour of autonomous vehicles is the 
fact that these processes can be determined in a detached 
and prescriptive manner. This signals a significant departure 
from collective understandings of appropriate behaviour in 
traffic accident scenarios anchored in reactions within con-
strained scenarios. Unspoken assumptions may be grounded 
in the responsive paradigm which obfuscate the innovation 
that is introduced by autonomous vehicles which are able to 
replicate a particular set of prescribed preferences. Finally, 
when these effects are taken together, the preferences that 
are inscribed in the algorithms that govern the behaviour 
of autonomous vehicles have a harmonising or consolidat-
ing effect on the range of possible behaviours that may be 
exhibited. These exert pressures capable of curbing diversity 
and variation; yet because it is difficult to observe and resist 
such opaque policies they can also unwittingly entrench 
themselves.
The distribution of the risks of operating autonomous 
vehicles (see also, Goodall 2016) may fall short of the tar-
geting paradigm specific individuals, yet the centralised 
and coordinated nature of algorithmic risk transforms this 
process to one of risk allocation rather than mere risk dis-
tribution. This is because allocation infers direction, edging 
towards intentionality, and emphasises the perspective of 
the patient-victim in the accident relationship by connoting 
the imposition of risk. Combining these influences together 
indicate the propensity for systematic harms and benefits to 
be generated from prescribing preferences.13 The centralised 
and coordinated nature of algorithmic risk allocation thus 
has the potential to consistently structure both burdens and 
benefits.
12 The suggestion here goes beyond the biased computer systems 
described by Friedman and Nissenbaum (1996): ‘A system discrim-
inates unfairly if it denies an opportunity or a good or if it assigns 
an undesirable outcome to an individual or group of individuals on 
grounds that are unreasonable or inappropriate’ (at 332).This sug-
gests that discrimination from technological artefacts bear human 
fingerprints, and responses such as value-sensitive design are able to 
go a long way towards meeting those concerns. Unlike the effects of 
biased computer systems discussed by Friedman and Nissenbaum, 
however, the structural form of discrimination countenanced here 
is difficult to fathom in a direct sense because the system neither 
“assigns” benefits or burdens, and it does not do so upon objectiona-
13 At a basic level, systematic outcomes are endemic in policies that 
stipulate preferences because of the probabilistic likelihood that one 
type of result will occur more often as a result of the preference set-
tings.
ble grounds. Rather, the system “optimises”, offering results that look 
a lot like discrimination. Furthermore, these “discriminatory” effects 
are difficult to encapsulate because they are both cumulative and 
emergent, and not directly and causally connected in traditional mani-
festations of discrimination. These differences suggest that it would 
be difficult to effectively apply the solutions that have been designed 
against computer bias to the present problems posed by structural dis-
crimination.
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This hypothetical differs fundamentally from the situation 
that human drivers encounter today in accident scenarios 
because these are atomised, unconnected and contextual. 
Human decisions, in other words, are individual choices 
that need not be affected by how others have acted in simi-
lar situations nor must they have impact upon others facing 
similar situations in the future. It is this independent and 
volitional character of human decision-making that grounds 
the need for responsibility: with discretionary leeway comes 
the need to justify one’s actions in a given situation. In this 
light, assertions of individual responsibility may indicate a 
lack of directing policy and thereby decrease the likelihood 
that structural inequalities are systematically disadvantaging 
specific groups.
Beyond responsibility? Structural inequalities 
and the non‑identity problem
The final piece of the structural inequality puzzle is found in 
the non-identity problem. Essentially, this problem under-
scores the fact that different lives are saved and sacrificed, a 
fact that is hidden in assertions that there will be a net sav-
ing of lives (Lin 2013a). The non-identity problem infuses 
individuality into otherwise utilitarian considerations which 
accord equal weighting to faceless ‘human units’ presented 
in philosophical thought-experiments. While some variants 
of the trolley problem introduce certain personal character-
istics, such as the variant that is designed to isolate factors of 
physical proximity and direct action by contemplating push-
ing a fat man off a bridge to stop the trolley (Edmonds 2013), 
the individuals in the thought experiment usually remain 
generic, indistinguishable and interchangeable human 
beings.14 In effect, trolley problems focus upon quantitative 
considerations; the non-identity problem factors in qualita-
tive considerations into crash optimisation calculations.
The prospect of recognising individual characteristics, 
however threaten to open the flood gates concerning which 
features can and will be recognised and what weighting these 
should be accorded. To some extent this has already taken 
place where gestures were made towards a dilemma between 
diverting an autonomous vehicle to hit either a motorcyclist 
wearing a helmet and another who does not (Lin 2015). As 
Patrick Lin observes, adherence to a principle aimed at mini-
mising harm would result in the autonomous vehicle hitting 
the helmeted motorcyclist because her odds of surviving the 
accident is higher, yet such an outcome places burdens upon 
exactly those who adopted prudential measures to minimise 
their exposure to risk. This example neatly encapsulates the 
structural concerns of centralised preferences and risk allo-
cation discussed above, because it illustrates the potential for 
certain groups to consistently bear a greater burden because 
of how their characteristics factor into the utilitarian crash 
optimisation framework.
The non-identity problem in the context of autonomous 
vehicles is not so much that individual lives may either 
be saved or lost as a direct consequence of implementing 
autonomous vehicles, but rather that the same centralised 
and coordinated rules govern their decisions. The possibil-
ity for identical responses that are governed by the same 
rule-structure creates a systemic and collective dimension 
whereby the generated outcomes will be systematically 
skewed. The crucial differentiator, and the source of dysto-
pian concerns therefore, should be the removal of individual 
or independent variation from range of available responses. 
Accumulating these skews together results in systematic bias 
that can ground allegations of pernicious, and pervasive, 
discrimination.
Drawing these threads together, the introduction of auton-
omous vehicles raises the prospect for systemic, rule-based 
disadvantages which may constitute a particularly odious 
kind of discrimination. Trolley problem ethics are rooted 
in isolated and decontextualized thought-experiments that 
overlook real-world ramifications that arise from aggregat-
ing preferences discerned from individualised, action-based 
perspectives. The trolley problem’s myopic focus upon the 
causes and consequences of a single scenario overlooks the 
possibility that the results will yield patterns and trends that 
cannot be predicted by studying the ethics in isolation. As a 
result of this ethical lens, accumulated effects cannot be rec-
ognised, thereby potentially sterilising what would otherwise 
be legal wrongs in conventional driving accident scenarios 
to mere harm and damage. Such structural pressures effec-
tively immunise the system against the prospect for legal 
liability.
A rough analogy can be drawn with the concept of 
emergence to illustrate these effects, whereby complex and 
unforeseen consequences can arise through accretion from 
mere adherence to simple rules (Gleick 1997). The focus of 
trolley problem ethics remains at the singular occurrence 
and fails to account for cumulative effects. Adopting this 
perspective shows the difficulties that lie ahead for those 
seeking to challenge potentially discriminatory outcomes. 
Algorithmic preferences can be readily defended on the basis 
that each resultant decision, considered in isolation, is jus-
tifiable. Furthermore, that the overall policies are designed 
to minimise overall harm reinforce this defence, such that 
any discriminatory effect can only be tangential because of 
a lack of intention (and possibly also unforeseeable) so that 
cumulative impacts remain unrecognised.
14 The choice of the fat man in the thought-experiment, for sublimi-
nal or pragmatic reasons, may hint towards discriminatory tenden-
cies, when considered in light of research suggesting that system-
atic discriminatory biases disadvantage obese individuals (Puhl and 
Brownell 2001).
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Buffering this burgeoning defence is the likelihood that 
empirical evidence will reflect the individualistic agent-cen-
tred perspectives espoused crash optimisation frameworks. 
For example, early studies show signs of such slant through 
the focus upon existing human preferences (Bonnefon et al. 
2015), thereby obscuring the opinion of those who may have 
to bear the consequences without enjoying the benefits of 
autonomous vehicle use. As we are currently at the early 
stages of development, however, it is not too late to imple-
ment complementary research that collates the preferences 
of members of the public who are not involved with car pur-
chases or car use in order to rectify this bias.15 On this note, 
it is also worth registering the possibility that cultural and 
regional variations will exist which also need to be explored 
and documented, considering the globalised nature of the 
automotive industry. Indeed, it may also be the case that 
such preferences need to be accounted for by manufactures 
for specific export markets in order to remain consistent with 
the priorities of the importing societies.
Speculative inequalities? The immunity device 
thought experiment
Up until this point, we have been discussing only the pros-
pect for implicit, perhaps even unintentional, structural 
inequalities that result from crash optimisation preferences 
designed to minimise objective levels of harm borne at a 
collective societal level. While speculative, a much more 
pernicious form of structural discrimination could, how-
ever, be developed that entails an elaboration of precisely 
the type of utilitarian calculus aimed at maximising collec-
tive happiness.
Taking departure in the above discussion on zero-sum 
structural risk displacement that accounts for the non-iden-
tity problem, what if the decision as to who the autonomous 
vehicle were to hit included considerations of an individual’s 
innate talent, cultured ability, or latent potential? In other 
words, might the obverse approach to crash-optimisation 
impulses suggest spreading a protective aegis over individu-
als offering special contributions to society? Thus, an alter-
native approach to crash-optimisation would be to prevent 
the largest qualitative losses rather than seeking to incremen-
tally minimise harms: a strategy preventing the worst out-
come rather than aiming for the least bad. Such an approach 
could justify safeguarding individuals with a rare skillset, 
as Joseph Louis Lagrange quipped after Antoine-Laurent 
de Lavoisier, widely acknowledged as the father of modern 
chemistry, was guillotined, “It took them only an instant to 
cut off this head, and one hundred years might not suffice to 
reproduce its like”. Would not society have an interest, albeit 
a potentially perverse one, in programming its autonomous 
vehicles to preserve the lives of its scientific and cultural 
elite in pursuit of the public benefit? After all, establish-
ing protective preferences for certain categories of persons 
is implicit in the emotional appeal when school buses are 
inserted into the trolley dilemma. The presence of children 
invokes our intuitive responses that the lives of the young 
and innocent are intrinsically worth protecting. And, if any 
doubt remains, it appears quite clear that our political leaders 
and diplomatic representatives enjoy high levels of personal 
protection not afforded to the ordinary citizen.
Following this logical track, it would not be unreason-
able for the manufacturers of autonomous vehicles to issue 
what I would call here an ‘immunity device’: the bearer of 
such a communicative device would become immune to col-
lisions with autonomous vehicles. Such an amulet would 
protect its owner in situations where an autonomous vehicle 
finds itself careening towards him or her, and would have the 
effect of deflecting the car away from that individual and 
thereby force the car to engage in a new trolley problem style 
dilemma elsewhere. If the justifications for the bearer of the 
immunity device are sufficiently strong, and their numbers 
suitably restricted, this might be a practical response to the 
new quandaries introduced by autonomous vehicles.
But this appears to be the thin end of a very large wedge. 
The scenario introduced above is binary and absolute: the 
immunity device offers complete protection. Yet, if the ena-
bling technology becomes available it is difficult to see how 
it would not expand due to market demand. Indeed, because 
such a device would prevent a victim from suffering an acci-
dent, rather than compensating a victim in the aftermath 
of an accident, it could conceivably become a preventative 
alternative to purchasing insurance policies. Developing the 
immunity device would introduce the ability for cars to com-
municate with their potential victims’ devices in the event of 
an “accident” (now a metaphorical term since eventualities 
are calculated), and a range of pressures would push these 
capabilities into desperate or greedy hands. For obvious 
reasons, a widespread system of immunity devices would 
be impracticable and self-defeating, so hierarchical nuances 
would have to be introduced: essentially a ranking system 
that eases the trolley problem calculus for any unfortunate 
autonomous vehicle. The autonomous vehicle will essen-
tially be playing a game of trump cards in the event of a 
trolley problem: whoever bears the highest status aversion 
device would be spared at the expense of those who possess 
lower status ones. This is a very uncomfortable outcome for 
what initially appeared to be a satisfactory configuration of 
15 Here, the methodologies deployed by value-sensitive design and 
especially those pertaining to the identification of direct and indirect 
stakeholders as well as the benefits and harms they might incur goes 
some way to addressing these issues (Friedman et al. 2006).
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benefits and burdens imposed by the autonomous vehicle 
of the future.
This then asks the question as to how to allocate the par-
ticular status an individual should have and therefore the 
concomitant level of risk that she should bear in relation 
to autonomous vehicles. But all its variants run against the 
bold proclamation in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights”. Were a meritocratic system to be imple-
mented, we might end up with the situation alluded to above, 
but perhaps more likely the distribution will be made eco-
nomically especially given the commercial opportunities for 
profit-making that such a system introduces. A particularly 
interesting scenario would be a closed market where a zero-
sum game is implemented where individuals seeking high 
status would be required to purchase the differential from 
other members of society, thus making risk displacement 
through material wealth explicit. Furthermore, recklessness 
incentives can be introduced where those with the resources 
are able to purchase their way out of harms’ way.16 It might 
even be possible to allocate risk as a form of punishment: 
those who have acted to the detriment of society might be 
forced to bear a burden of increased risk as a form of com-
pensation. Yet, however the final structure may be, its hier-
archical effects are evident, as are the tendencies towards 
heuristics, categorisation and entrenchment.
Leaving aside the practical details associated with the 
future market for autonomous vehicles, such as whether 
manufacturers will offer such systems, whether they would 
be preferential towards their own clientele and whether they 
would coordinate and centralise such a scheme, the ramifi-
cation of such a system is that risk of injury shifts towards 
prevention rather than cure. Rather than enforce accident 
insurance upon drivers to cover for their future faults, this 
system would place a large share of the burden upon the 
ordinary citizen to avoid or minimise the likelihood of injury 
arising from autonomous vehicles. This fundamentally shifts 
the burden of risk from the agent-driver to the patient-
pedestrian. In pre-determining the allocation of risks and 
costs in advance of any accidents, the remaining fault that 
must be covered by the driver (in reality the manufacturer 
of the autonomous vehicle) would be for departures from 
the course of action that has been promised in advance, and 
not the actual outcome caused by the autonomous vehicle. 
This would substantially narrow the range of liability for the 
agent-driver—the party who introduces the risk in the first 
place (see also, de Sio 2017).
To make matters even more complex is the fact that 
autonomous vehicles are not developed from any semblance 
of a neutral situation, but rather by corporate entities seek-
ing to make material profits from their efforts. Even if such 
motives do not taint the product directly, preferences that 
increase profits are likely to become embedded in the deci-
sional architecture of the autonomous vehicle that a com-
pany produces. It is neither uncommon nor unreasonable for 
a car manufacturer today to emphasise the safety features of 
its models that protect its customers and passengers. A driver 
who takes the decision to hurt others in order to protect his 
or her own interests similarly acts within the boundaries of 
social acceptability. Yet, when these two characteristics are 
united in the autonomous vehicle, however, the perceptions 
may shift. The vehicle subtly transitions from an artefact 
towards being an agent: from something that is inanimate 
and subject to human control to something that observes, 
orients, decides and acts (Suchman and Weber 2016). Cross-
ing this line implicates programming that may systemati-
cally elevate the safety of its customers and occupants over 
all others, not least because an autonomous vehicle would 
not be able to convincingly make account of its decision-
making processes. In an important sense the outcome, where 
the prospect of harm is unavoidable, has been automated and 
pre-determined: because discretionary autonomy is intro-
duced without clear channels of responsibility, this has the 
effect of immunising the effects from responsibility.
The aim with the advent of autonomous vehicles should 
not merely be to integrate them into contemporary society 
and simply continue with business as usual, but rather to 
consider how such fantastic technologies may improve the 
daily lives of both those who own and access them as well 
as those who stand to be harmed through their introduction. 
Taking a glimpse into possible, dystopian, futures should 
provide us with a reality check that fuels the debate on how 
we want autonomous vehicles to behave, from all perspec-
tives and standpoints. To abdicate such inclusive processes 
risks the introduction of a technology that favours the few 
and which exacerbates inequalities.
Maintaining injustices: two levels of responsibility 
gaps?
To draw these analyses together, there may be two different 
levels at which autonomous vehicles can introduce injustices 
for the victims of accidents which these will cause. While 
difficult to articulate precisely, they may be loosely framed 
as responsibility gaps. The first level involves the individu-
alised division of responsibility in both circumstantial (the 
pragmatic situations where autonomous vehicles will be 
used) and conceptual contexts (primarily arising from the 
conflation between role and outcome responsibilities) (Liu 
2016). As with the autonomous weapons systems discussion, 
while circumstantial responsibility questions are capable of 
16 I owe this idea to John Danaher, in conversation on Algocracy, 
https://algocracy.wordpress.com/.
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being resolved through improved implementation of auton-
omous vehicles, the conceptual responsibility question 
will persist until the theoretical gaps between the separate 
notions of responsibility are harmonised (Liu 2016). Exac-
erbating responsibility gaps at this level are the uncertain-
ties that hang over the distribution of liability between the 
users, programmers, and manufacturers: impunity is likely 
to arise in instances where responsibility is a possibility, but 
which is neither necessary nor certain (Liu 2015). Insofar as 
the responsibility questions at this level are not adequately 
addressed, our regulatory framework will remain misaligned 
with evolving practical realities.
Beyond the question of impunity for direct harms caused 
by autonomous vehicles are the structural pressures and sys-
temic biases which widespread autonomous vehicle opera-
tion might precipitate. The responsibility concerns at this 
second level have hitherto remained imperceptible, raising 
the question whether conventional concepts of responsi-
bility can even be meaningfully deployed in such diffused 
contexts. This would suggest that the probabilistic burdens 
borne by different groups will remain unrecognised and 
unaddressed. Insofar these effects are not raised as questions 
of responsibility, the systematic harm and damage caused by 
autonomous vehicle implementation will therefore remain 
unrecognised as injuries, understood in the above discussion 
meaning legal wrongs.
Delving deeper, there may be two sub-level issues con-
flated within this second level of injustices: responsibility for 
the direct impact of autonomous vehicle usage, and responsi-
bility for the discriminatory pressures exerted by the system 
of autonomous vehicles operating as a whole. The former 
involve assertions of liability for what appear to amount as 
redistributions or heightened imposition of risks: do reallo-
cations of risk imply or mandate reapportioning responsibili-
ties? The latter concerns the application of responsibility to 
processes that might look like discrimination, but which do 
not accord benefits or burdens upon impermissible grounds 
which define classical discrimination: can responsibility be 
applied to account for processes which mimic discrimina-
tory outcomes?
Interposing the prospect for structural discrimination 
arising from optimisation processes into questions of the 
responsibility gap underscores the under-preparedness 
of our juridical system in relation to autonomous vehicle 
usage. Regulatory discussions typically engage with the first 
level responsibility gap, seeking to apportion responsibility 
between the proximate human beings (Schulzke 2013). Thus, 
second-level responsibility questions relating to both the 
outcome and the processes of systematically redistributing 
risk in pursuit of crash optimisation creates an overlooked 
responsibility gap. Insofar as increased burdens and risks are 
imposed upon certain groups without the legal system devel-
oping concomitant concepts and processes to challenge these 
effects, these responsibility gaps at the systemic level will be 
the foundation for subtle forms of injustice that autonomous 
vehicles will unwittingly introduce.
Concluding thoughts
Possible shifts to ameliorate some of these challenges 
include refocussing responsibility doctrines away from 
competence, capacity, control and causation and towards 
the beneficiaries of the activities instead. Thus, an risk-
based accountability duty can be forged between on the one 
hand the occupiers of the autonomous vehicles who ben-
efit from usage, and the programmers and manufacturers 
who profit commercially, and on the other hand those third 
parties to whom are allocated greater burdens as a result 
of these activities. Instead of hinging upon autonomy and 
discretion, such an accountability duty would instead be con-
nected to the introduction or redistribution of risks posed to 
other parties. While such an accountability duty looks very 
much like causal responsibility, the conceptual differences 
are two-fold. As a duty it is a procedural relationship which 
circumvents the direct causal requirement; its basis upon 
the imposition of risk may allow it to navigate the second 
level of responsibility gap involving structural or systemic 
displacements of risk. This should have the effect of shifting 
the onus to the agents to justify their decisions and account 
for the consequences ensuing from their activities. In doing 
so, third parties who are poised to be burdened with addi-
tional risks and imposed with subtle new vulnerabilities will 
be foregrounded in the responsibility calculus concerning 
autonomous vehicles and have more direct access to those 
who benefit from their operation.
To do this, the question of responsibility should also shift 
from the traditional ‘who-dunnit’ approach popular in crime 
fictions to focus instead on the broader structural issues cap-
tured by asking why it happened. Doing so encourages a 
re-evaluation of whether traditional legal notions of respon-
sibility, both criminal and tortious, should be extended to 
the autonomous vehicle, and to define the limitations of 
these legal doctrines. As we have seen, autonomous vehi-
cles replace the human driver who is both in direct control 
and bear the full gamut of responsibilities. As ascriptions of 
responsibility become increasingly tenuous and artificial, 
questions arise as to whether the doctrine remains tenable 
in face of contemporary challenges.
The purpose, then, is to question whether existing rules 
which govern human driven traffic should be unthinkingly 
applied to frame the regulation of autonomous vehicles. It 
may be, for example, that tort law can grapple and govern 
autonomous vehicles (Graham 2012), but the criminal law 
with its focus on individual mental states can usefully be 
excluded. In order to assess the continuing relevance of 
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responsibility concepts in relation to autonomous vehicles, 
the overarching purpose for their deployment needs to be 
articulated. This must then be set against eroding the plau-
sibility or legitimacy of contriving or contorting those con-
cepts to adapt them to autonomous vehicles. As a result, the 
natural malleability of the concepts must be respected, as to 
stretch them to breaking point would be a pyrrhic victory 
that ultimately undermines legal concepts more broadly.
Moving to crash optimisation impulses, bright regulatory 
lines may be necessary to curb some of the excesses envis-
aged here, and to militate against the possibility of indirect 
systematic discrimination through algorithmic policies. 
To establish impermissible types of development requires 
broad public engagement well in advance of technological 
maturation, and ideally at an earlier stage such that regula-
tion can influence design and implementation. The thought-
experiment outlined in this article that underscores the pos-
sibility for active (and perhaps not incidentally, profitable) 
forms of inequality may arise from an alignment of commer-
cial and individual incentives that can go unchecked, or at 
least remain under-regulated. More prosaically, soliciting a 
broader range of opinion could lessen the prospect for regu-
latory blind-spots and increase the confidence of both those 
driving the technology forward as well as potential users and 
victims of autonomous vehicles.
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